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New technologies should lead us to look more closely at just what
values the Constitution seeks to preserve.
-Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace'
Black's Law Dictionary defines contraband as "any property which is
unlawful to produce or possess."'2 In this Note, I focus on a new class of
contraband, digital contraband, in a new enforcement setting, cyberspace. I
want to ask what restraints might exist under Fourth Amendment doctrine on
the government's ability to discover and prosecute possession of such digital
contraband. My attention is focused particularly on an automated, wide-scale
search that could hypothetically scan through hundreds of millions of files but
would report to authorities only the presence of files containing contraband.
More than just providing insight into law enforcement power in
cyberspace, the nature--or lack-of restraints on such a search may provide
insights into the Fourth Amendment itself. 3 While the government may never
I. Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law And Liberty Beyond the Electronic
Frontier, THE HUMANIST, SeptJOct. 1991, at 15, 16 (emphasis deleted).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990).
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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actually conduct the sort of search described in this Note, the Net-wide search
provides a concrete and easily visualized case of a "perfect search." This
image, in turn, leads us to ask if the power to conduct a "perfect search"
would extend unacceptably the reach of government. Justice Potter Stewart
once observed that the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places";4 the
prospect of regular searches for contraband in cyberspace may require us to
address the question, "From what?"
Does the Fourth Amendment merely seek to limit the government's ability
to discover purely private information, or should the Amendment also serve to
restrict the government's access to relevant evidence of criminal activity? In
the past, the two limitations were inseparable; the protection from arbitrary
searches provided an unacknowledged but potentially quite important pocket
of privacy in which individuals might be free to resist the state's demands. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment constrains the
effectiveness of the police, but it has generally cast that constraint as the
undesirable but necessary price of protecting innocent citizens from selective
application of searches and unjustified invasions of privacy.5 Even those
commentators who have criticized the Court's recent tendency to permit
suspicionless searches have framed their arguments in terms of the need to
limit police discretion and protect private information the government has no
right to learn.6 As we enter a new age, however, in which it may be possible
for the authorities to scan broadly for evidence of illegal conduct without
learning anything else, we must ask whether a freedom from such surveillance
is not part of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."7
This Note begins with a description of a hypothetical Net-wide search,
drawing out those features that make it particularly useful for examining
Fourth Amendment doctrine. It then analyzes the constitutionality of such a
search under the bright-line, property-based standard that dominated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence from the 1880s through the late 1960s,8 and
compares the relatively high level of protection for individuals under that
standard to the low level of protection likely to be applied under the current
balancing test. Finally, the Note concludes by sketching some of the important
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) ("Each time the exclusionary rule is applied
it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights."); see also Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1393 (1983) ("It is the price the framers anticipated
and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property against unrestrained
governmental power.").
6. See, e.g., Thomas A. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness
of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 632 (1995) ("Individualized suspicion ... has served
as a bedrock protection against unjustified and arbitrary police actions.").
7. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
8. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
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values that inhered in the property-based standard and that would likely
militate against any government conduct that approached a "perfect search."
I. THE SEARCH
A. Life in Cyberspace
No American with any exposure to the mass media in the 1990s can be
unaware of the concept of the "information superhighway." 9 Video, audio,
text, and numbers will all be stored and transported as digital data, allowing
homes and businesses to connect to each other and to giant information
storehouses with an ease never before imaginable. The same computer that
balances your checkbook and processes your letters will work as a gateway to
a new world; you will be able to call up this week's episode of Star Trek,
peruse Shakespearean sonnets or Hegelian philosophy, video conference with
your sister in Hawaii, or wander through L.L. Bean's electronic warehouse.
And the gateway will work both ways: From your office or the airport, you
will be able to connect to your home to get your video messages, update your
calendar, grab a video of your dog to show your colleagues, or double-check
the address of a friend in Taiwan.
Cyberspace may be described as the nonphysical "place" where electronic
communications happen and digital data are located. In its most narrow
formulation, "cyberspace" is a synonym for the Internet, "an immense network
of networks that connects an estimated twenty million computer users by
telephone lines to thousands of electronic information storehouses
worldwide."' 0 Every "futuristic" possibility described in the preceding
paragraph is already a reality on the Internet. Not only can one access great
storehouses of information from a machine in one's home or office, but one
can access that machine from thousands of miles away."
Of course, if it is possible for one person to access her own machine
through public networks, then it is also possible for others to do so. These
others may be invited guests allowed into limited areas of the owner's system
to share information, or they may be unwanted intruders who have connected
to her computer to search for details about her work, her system, and her
life.' 2 For the inquisitive, a computer's hard drive can be a treasure trove of
9. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Welcome to Cyberspace: What Is It? Where Is it? And How Do We Get
There?, TIME, Mar. 22, 1995, at 4, 6. ("All of this is being breathlessly reported in the press .... ).
10. Anne Meredith Fulton, Comment, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will be the Privacy Police?,
3 CoMhiLAW CONSPEcrUS 63, 63 (1995).
1I. Naturally, one's machine can only be accessed when it is on and connected to the network.
Increasingly, however, as the computer assimilates the functions of video phone, answering machine, fax
machine, mail box, and on-line storehouse, people will be inclined to leave their machines available 24
hours a day.
12. See John Markoff, Taking a Computer Crime to Heart, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1995, § 1, at 33.
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information, 3 and if the intruder is sophisticated, the owner may never even
realize that anyone unauthorized has accessed her system at all.'
4
As we enter a world in which people increasingly transact and record their
lives on computers, and in which those computers increasingly are connected
to public networks, the prospect of a search through one's hard drive seems
more threatening. Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher conducted a
survey to measure people's subjective sense of the intrusiveness of various
governmental actions, and they discovered that the "tapping into [a]
corporation's hard drive" seemed almost exactly as intrusive as a "search of
[a] college dormitory room."' 5 And while today in 1996 one might plausibly
claim that anyone on the Internet has voluntarily assumed a lessened
expectation of privacy by connecting, this argument becomes increasingly
unreasonable the more digital connections become central to our lives. 6 At
an almost unbelievable rate, private life is moving into cyberspace: The
Internet is growing at a rate of approximately ten percent per month,' 7 and
people are using the Net not only to exchange ideas and data but to conduct
courtships, financial transactions, and more. Corporate offices are going on-line
at a similar rate, connecting individual office computers to the vast potential
of the Internet. One has only to look at the wave of billion-dollar mergers and
deals in the cable, telephone, entertainment, and banking industries to
appreciate how many believe that cyberspace will soon be as ubiquitous and
indispensable as televisions, telephones, and radios.
8
13. C. Ryan Reetz, Note, Warrant Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Ellen C. Lesser & Gordon T. Thompson, How a Hacker Tried to Fool a Security Expert,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1995, at D19 (reporting story of hacker discovered only because of exceptionally
sophisticated defense); see also Terri A. Cutrera, Note, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental
Rights of Computer Users, 60 UMKC L. REV. 139, 142 (1991).
15. Christopher Slobogin &Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations ofPrivacy andAutonomy
in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society, " 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 763 (1993).
16. Similarly, in 1928 it may have seemed reasonable to assume that anyone with a phone had
voluntarily assumed the risk that the line would be tapped. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 466 (1928) ("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside... "), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Today, no one using the phone believes they are voluntarily accepting such
a risk: "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communications." Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
Put another way, virtually no one would feel that they have assumed the risk that others will examine
their voice mail merely because their messages are accessible from remote locations. This is true even
though voice mail "hackers" are not uncommon. Neither does one lose an expectation of privacy in one's
home because the lock is shoddy and thieves are rampant; if the location invokes Fourth Amendment
protection, any barrier to prying eyes suffices. By contrast, if a location does not invoke such protection,
no barrier is sufficient. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (ruling private fields
not protected despite fences and "no trespassing" signs).
17. Edward Baig, Ready to Cruise the Internet?, Bus. WK., Mar. 28, 1994, at 180, 180.
18. Don L. Boroughs & David Fischer, Big! Heightened Global Competition, Innovative Technology
and Washington's Friendly Regulatory Climate Have Unleashed a New 71dal Wave of Corporate Mergers
in America, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 1995, at 46, 46-48.
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B. The World of "Digital Contraband"
Of course, the same digital lines that allow people to send videos of their
children to each other also allow them to send videos of child pornography to
each other. These same lines that can deliver software instantly from a
manufacturer can also be used to exchange, at virtually no cost, perfect copies
of pirated music, copyrighted photographs, or unauthorized commercial
software. Stolen credit card numbers, telephone access codes, and programs
designed specifically to break into other computers 9 inevitably find their way
through the network. This is the world of digital contraband.
More precisely, digital contraband is any computer file that, outside of
very specific authorized exceptions, cannot be legally possessed. For example,
mere ownership of digital videos of child pornography constitutes a federal
crime.20 Similarly, owning a "cracked" copy of a commercial program-one
that has been illegally modified to remove licensing protection-is a violation
of copyright or contract law.2' Of course, there are some legal uses of digital
contraband,22 but as with traditional contraband, the mere possession of the
analogous digital files would create a strong presumption of illegal activity by
the owner.
C. Law Enforcement Cruises the Net
Just as possessors of digital contraband may use the Internet to transfer
files back to their hard drives, law enforcement agencies might use the fact
that such hard drives are connected to the Internet to seek out evidence of
illegalities. The interest that a law enforcement officer might have in
examining the contents of a hard drive is obvious; the trove of information
there may yield important insights into crimes that the owner may have
committed.23 At the same time, the privacy interest that an individual may
19. "The ECPA [Electronic Communications Privacy Act] ... makes it illegal to manufacture,
assemble, possess, or sell any device which is primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of
electronic communications .... Software appears to fall within the conception of a 'device' used to
intercept computer communications." Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer
Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 93 (1994).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1995) (criminalizing possession of three or more items that
contain visual depiction of child pornography if such pornography has been shipped in interstate commerce
or produced using materials shipped in interstate commerce---"including by computer"); see also Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (upholding criminalization of possession of child pornography).
21. It is currently legal to modify programs for archiving purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (Supp. 1995).
Nevertheless, copy protections exist (and others could be designed) that allow for archiving a program and
still restrict the program's use to a particular machine. Any modification to such a protection would violate
the law and create a species of digital contraband.
22. For example, a system manager may possess a hacking program to test his own security. See 18
U.S.C. § 2512(2)(a) (Supp. 1995). Of course, there are also legitimate research and law enforcement uses
for narcotics and automatic weapons.
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991) (explaining how computer files
linked suspect to murder for which he was convicted).
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have in the hard drive is also obvious; regardless of whether or not the officer
finds evidence of a crime, he may well learn much about the owner's private
life in the process of looking through the drive.24 A number of commentators
have written recently about the need for a warrant to ensure limits to the range
of the examination-and, consequently, the potential for violation of
privacy-possible in a hard drive search?5
All of these commentators have assumed that a human investigator will be
examining the hard drive to evaluate its contents. Nevertheless, there are
certain types of investigations-particularly those focused on digital
contraband-in which no human is needed to determine the presence or
absence of relevant evidence. A computer program can be designed, for
instance, to search through a hard drive and report only the presence or
absence of an exact copy of a certain piece of illegally modified software. 6
Such an object-targeted search program would ignore any legitimate copy of
the commercial software, as well as any copy that was cracked in even a
trivially different way.27 The program would naturally also ignore everything
else on the disk, no matter how blatantly illegal-or sensationally intriguing-a
human investigator might find that information.
Since such a search program would require an exact copy of the target
digital contraband when seeking matching files, the search would be of limited
use in targeting particular individuals under suspicion. Say an officer suspects
an individual of trafficking in child pornography. The officer could not simply
turn the search program loose with the orders that it find any sexually explicit
material involving underaged participants. Instead, the officer would need
a copy of a particular digital video clip that he believed the suspect possessed,
and the search program would tell the officer nothing more than whether that
particular clip was on the system. If the suspect had a slightly different video
or was clever enough to keep the video encrypted or located on a removable
cartridge that was not accessible from the Internet, the search would fail.
However, let us imagine for the moment that the government had acquired
technical access sufficient to run such a search program on a large number of
24. See Randolph Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data
Privacy, 81 VA. L. REv. 1181, 1222-23 (1995) (discussing possible range of police search).
25. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 19; Reetz, supra note 13; Sergent, supra note 24.
26. Sergent, supra note 24, at 1204-05.
27. It would also be possible to design a computer search program that looked for smaller sections
within software and therefore reported a much greater amount of information. Such a search would reveal
irrelevant information and, consequently, would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment. See infra Section
II.B. This Note is focused on the more difficult question of a search that can only inform law enforcement
of the definitive presence of digital contraband.
28. The officer might tum the program loose with the orders to find the words "child pornography."
Nevertheless, not only is the presence of the words "child pornography" insufficient evidence of anything
criminal to justify the search, but any search that at heart inquires into the intellectual/verballmental beliefs
of an individual risks treading on First Amendment values. Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86
(1965) (holding warrant for "books, records, pamphlets" of Texas Communist Party impermissibly broad
in light of First Amendment).
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networked hard drives simultaneously. 29 Let us further posit that the running
of the search program would have a negligible impact on each of the
individual systems,30 and that the search program would report nothing more
than the presence or absence of a given piece of digital contraband. Under this
scenario, a law enforcement officer who through ordinary means discovered
one copy of a piece of digital contraband-a child porn video or a copy of
WordPerfect cracked by "Captain Blood"3M-might infer that since one
computer owner has this file, others may as well. The officer might then run
a Net-wide search for that contraband. He certainly would not capture every
single person who possessed it, but he might nevertheless identify dozens,
hundreds, or even thousands of individuals who did have a copy on their
computers and for whom he would then have probable cause to request a
search warrant.32
29. There are a number of ways that the government might achieve such technical access. For
example, the famous "Internet worm" released by Robert Morris seized control of thousands of systems
connected to the Net by exploiting security flaws in Unix systems well known to the National Security
Agency and others in the computer security field. See KATIE HAFNER & JOHN.MARKOFF, CYBERPUNK:
OUTLAWS AND HACKERS ON THE COMPUTER FRONTIER 253-341 (1991). The worm was designed to run
unobtrusively in the background, and if it had functioned as Morris originally intended, it might never have
been noticed by systems operators.
Still another possibility would be to contract with a private party who had already obtained
information about the possession of digital contraband. As part of the test copy for Windows 95, for
example, Microsoft included a small program that would by default deliver to Microsoft a record of
programs run on the user's machine whenever a user signed onto the new Microsoft Network. In Short;
Thwarting 'Softlifters,' INFO. WK., May 22, 1995, at 88, 88. Given the Court's conclusion in United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), that an individual had no Fourth Amendment interest sufficient to object
to a seizure of records of his checking account maintained by his bank, it seems likely that the
government's purchase or seizure of records from a network or operating-system vendor would be
constitutional.
In sum, while such a search is presently hypothetical, it is technically possible-in much the same
sense that a free flow of traffic during L.A.'s rush hour is possible. This Note does not argue that such a
possibility is likely, but merely that the concrete nature of this hypothetical search allows us to better
envision and understand the structure of the Fourth Amendment.
30. One of the first responses that many people seem to have to the prospect of such a search is to
fight the hypothetical. They argue that even if this search were possible in theory, there is an unacceptably
high probability that the government would botch the search program (as Morris did with his worm) such
that the search would damage the target systems. While certainly a proven failure would weigh heavily
against the use of such a search, the search is at least hypothetically feasible, and one suspects that many
would prefer to avoid grappling with the search if any grounds might be found to avoid considering it. The
aversion to contemplating this search leads me to believe that many feel a deep uneasiness with the
prospect of a successful search of this nature, even if they are unable to articulate a reasoned ground on
which to object to such a surgically targeted search.
31. See Sofrware-Piracy Case in Los Angeles Leads to Felony Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995,
at BI0 (describing capture of software pirate Thomas Nick Alefantes, known as "Captain Blood," and
seizure of an estimated $1 million worth of illegally copied software).
32. It might be objected that sophisticated users would either keep their data off-line or encrypt every
file in order to evade detection. Put another way, this question asks if the mere fact of leaving the data
technically accessible amounts to an assumption of risk equivalent to leaving an automatic weapon visible
from an outside window. The obvious answer is, that inasmuch as the data is not publicly visible, leaving
such data on-line is more analogous to keeping an automatic weapon in an unlocked closet. Given the
Court's conclusion in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), that merely lifting a turntable to reveal its
serial number constituted a search, it seems unlikely that the status of such a search would turn on the extra
levels of protection that one might take with data in one's possession. A court should not consider the
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The search just described presents a novel set of characteristics: 33 As part
of a dragnet search, individuals' hard drives are searched without their
permission and without any particularized cause to believe them guilty, and the
search scans through a vast amount of very personal information located within
people's offices and homes. At the same time, however, the search has a
minimal impact on property,3' produces no false positives, need not be
noticeable, and reveals nothing to officials beyond the identity of some
individuals who possess this particular piece of digital contraband.35 How
might the Fourth Amendment treat such a search?36 And what does this tell
us about the Fourth Amendment?
II. THE LAW
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has set forth two distinct
paradigms for interpreting the nature and limits of the Fourth Amendment.
Until the late 1960s, the Court grounded its regulation of government searches
in the concept of "constitutionally protected areas. 37 Under this view, the
Court perceived the Fourth Amendment as a bright-line, property-based
standard that required a warrant, supported by probable cause, for most
physical trespasses onto private land.38 However, in the years following its
1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio39 to vastly widen the scope of the
Amendment by applying the exclusionary rule to state police officers, the
Court came to recognize that the bright-line standard provided too limited a
absence of encryption on one's personal hard drive to be an assumption of risk any more than the absence
of a deadbolt (or even a locked door) is an invitation for an official search of one's home.
33. Although this search is novel in a real life context, Professor Loewy considered the hypothetical
of an "evidence-detecting divining rod" that would lead police directly to evidence of wrongdoing. See
Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229,
1244 (1983). Professor Loewy's conclusion that "there could be no fourth amendment objection to [the
rod's] use," id. at 1246, is considered in Part III, infra.
34. In seizing control of the computer to run the search, the government's program would almost
certainly slow other uses of the computer for a brief period, as well as adding a trivial amount of wear to
the computer hardware. This impact, while real, is clearly de minimis.
35. In this way, the Net-wide search differs from most searches that enhance natural senses because
generally sense-enhanced searches "cannot be as focused as traditional physical searches." David E.
Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563, 577 (1990). The search also
differs from dog-sniffs, which, while generally accurate and nonintrusive, lack both the broad reach of the
Net-wide search and its nonconfrontational character. See infra Section II.B.
36. The search, even if legal under the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment, might not be legal
under various state versions of the Amendment that have at times been construed more liberally. See, e.g.,
People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (N.Y. 1990) (interpreting state constitutional provision worded
same as Fourth Amendment as covering broader range of searches). Of course, such state constitutional
concerns might not be relevant if the search were conducted by a federal agent.
37. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
38. Under the property standard, the Court recognized only a very limited class of well-defined and
long-established exceptions to the warrant requirement, including exigent circumstances, open fields, and
(pursuant to the government's obligation to ensure the safety of the roads) automobiles. See Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970) (listing exceptions).
39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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realm of protection from government searches. In three landmark cases, Katz
v. United States,40 Camara v. Municipal Court,41 and Terry v. Ohio,42 the
Court revised its approach to the Fourth Amendment and attempted to
articulate a standard that directly incorporated the values that inhered in a
"constitutionally protected area." The resulting balancing method replaced the
use of property as a central value, developing instead a values-focused test that
weighs the government's interest in a search against the potential for police
abuse of discretion and the threat to an individual's privacy inherent in the
search.
This part explores the probable status of the Net-wide search first under
the bright-line test of the pre-Katz Court and then under the current balancing
approach. This review of the relevant case law demonstrates that the Net-wide
search for digital contraband would be per se unreasonable under the
"constitutionally protected areas" standard, and yet per se reasonable under the
Court's balancing test as currently formulated. If this analysis is correct, one
must ask whether the case of the Net-wide search is nothing more than a very
anomalous case in which the pre-Katz standard would have provided too much
protection, or whether there are in fact potentially important interests implicit
in the Fourth Amendment that the Court has thus far failed to include in its
balancing test.
A. The Pre-Katz Bright-Line Standard
In the Supreme Court's first significant examination of the Fourth
Amendment, Boyd v. United States,43 the Court found the protection of
property to represent the core of the Amendment. In Boyd, the firm of E.A.
Boyd and Sons was accused of claiming thirty-five more cases of plate glass
as exempt from customs duties than it had actually used in constructing federal
buildings;44 the Court faced the question of whether the government could
subpoena Boyd's papers for use against the firm. Writing for a majority of
seven, Justice Bradley traced the history of the British use of the writs of
assistance, by which officers of the Crown were empowered "in their
discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods., 45 After explaining
that the opposition to such sweeping and suspicionless searches was "perhaps
the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies, 46
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
42. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Only two majority opinions prior to Boyd, Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469,
482 (1877), and Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), even mention the Fourth Amendment, and
both summarily conclude that the Amendment was violated.
44. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
45. Id. at 625.
46. Id.
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Justice Bradley went on to conclude that the protection of an individual's
property interest served to restrict "all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' 47
The Court found that the papers were Boyd's property, and that Boyd alone
was entitled to possess them.4 8 Even against a "search" as targeted and
minimally intrusive as a subpoena, the Court found that one's private property
interest outweighed the government's interest in prosecuting crime.
49
Although later decisions retreated to some extent from Boyd's absolute
protection of private property,50 they retained its property-based orientation.
In a series of cases beginning with Hester v. United States,5' the Court
mapped out a variety of "constitutionally protected" locations. 2 Under this
approach to the Fourth Amendment, government agents might freely inspect
any unprotected area, but save for a "few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions,"53 official intrusion into a protected area required a
warrant supported by probable cause.
The property-based model of the Fourth Amendment is well illustrated by
Olmstead v. United States,54 a 1928 case that arguably represented the Court's
first foray into the jurisprudence of cyberspace.55 In Olmstead, the Court held
that federal agents had not violated the Fourth Amendment when they tapped
the home and office phones of a suspected bootlegger.56 A warrant was not
necessary for a wire tap, wrote Chief Justice Taft, in large part because "the
intervening wires [where the tap was placed] are not part of [the suspect's]
house or office."57 So long as government agents had not pierced the physical
borders of the home or office, the Fourth Amendment accorded Olmstead no
protection.
Applying the same trespass model over three decades later in Silverman
v. United States,58 the Court found that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated by the insertion of a microphone into an individual's basement heating
duct. This small insertion effectively turned the whole heating system into a
house-wide microphone. Noting that "the eavesdropping was accomplished by
47. Id. at 630.
48. Id. at 623.
49. Id. at 631-32.
50. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70-75 (1906) (listing cases allowing subpoenas of documents
and holding documents of any incorporated firm subject to proper subpoena).
51. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding "open fields" not constitutionally protected areas in light of common
law "open fields" exception).
52. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) (listing protected areas, including house, office,
store, hotel room, automobile, and taxicab, but concluding that visitors' room of jail was not protected
area).
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see supra note 38.
54. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, once defined cyberspace as
"'that place you are in when you are talking on the telephone."' Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 9, at 8.
56. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
57. Id. at 465.
58. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by
the petitioners,"59 the Court found that the penetration converted the
eavesdropping into a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This physical
intrusion into a protected physical sphere was, for the Court, the decisive
difference between Olmstead and Silverman.
Silverman makes clear that under the property-based standard, a Net-wide
search could not withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Any governmental
conduct that intruded, even minimally, into a constitutionally protected area
without a warrant would violate the Amendment's mandate. The fact that the
officer himself is outside the zone would be no more relevant for the Net-wide
search than it was for the Court in Silverman; the intrusion of the
government's search program into the sanctity of a private home or office
would trigger the need for probable cause. And the Net-wide search, in
invading a subject's hard drive and momentarily seizing control of the
computer to execute its scan, would constitute such an intrusion.
The Net-wide search by its very nature precludes a probable cause
justification for the intrusion. Because it is simpler and more effective to
physically seize a suspect's hard drive than to attempt to access it through the
network,6" an officer who possessed probable cause would secure a traditional
warrant for a traditional search. By contrast, law enforcement would use the
Net-wide search only when seeking to identify unknown possessors of digital
contraband. The search seeks to examine as many drives as it can access, and
the likelihood of access bears no relation to the likelihood of illicit files. Under
the bright-line test, such a search would be a search without individualized
suspicion and-by definition-a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Katz and Beyond: The Balancing Approach
In the late 1960s, the Court revised its bright-line approach and developed
a balancing test that weighed the government's interest in a search against the
costs of the search's invasion of individual privacy. The result, as Louis
Seidman has noted, is that "[m]odern Fourth Amendment law focuses on what
might be called the 'collateral damage' imposed by searches.' Collateral
damage includes the involuntary disclosure of personal information not relevant
to the investigation, as well as the "violence, disruption, and humiliation" 62
implicit in any search. When the Court speaks of a privacy interest in the
context of the Fourth Amendment, it is almost certainly referring to an
59. Id. at 509.
60. For a discussion of the difficulty of using such a search program to verify the presence of
contraband on a particular drive, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
61. Louis Michael Seidman, The Problem with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1086
(1995).
62. Id. at 1087.
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individual's interest in avoiding either collateral personal revelations or
humiliating and potentially violent confrontations with agents of the
government. By contrast, where the Court finds none of these collateral
damages, it is unlikely to find a violation of privacy.
The Court initiated its revision of the bright-line approach when confronted
with a series of cases in which that approach either would have allowed too
much collateral damage or, by requiring that the government have probable
cause, would have unreasonably hampered important social interests. In Katz
v. United States,63 the Court faced the question of whether a wiretap on a
public phone was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than accept the
conclusion of Olmstead and Silverman that the Fourth Amendment's
supervision of collateral damage ends at the border of the home.or office, the
Court instead rejected the absolute line between those areas and the rest of the
world. Justice Stewart explained that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 64 Katz's
phone conversation could not be intercepted without a warrant.
If Katz established that the traditional probable cause standard could apply
outside the home and office, Camara v. Municipal Court65 established that
searches of the home need not always require probable cause if the intrusion
is limited. Camara presented the question of whether a housing inspector
required a warrant to enter an apartment against the tenant's wishes.
Confronted with the municipality's argument that adherence to the traditional
probable cause standard would significantly compromise the usefulness of
66housing inspectors, the Court upheld the search. In light of the unique need
for collective inspections and the "relatively limited invasion of privacy" 67
involved in searches targeted at buildings rather than individuals, the Court
found that such an "inspection is a 'reasonable' search" of the home despite
the lack of individualized suspicion.68
The third case, Terry v. Ohio,69 presented the Court with the question of
whether a police frisk implicated the Fourth Amendment. Had it chosen to
maintain the traditional probable cause requirement, the Court either would
have had to allow officers unlimited discretion to frisk (and potentially harass)
or it would have had to require probable cause of an officer before he could
make sure that a suspect was not armed. Again, the Court chose instead to
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
65. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
66. Id. at 536.
67. Id. at 537.
68. Id. at 538.
69. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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modify the traditional test, explaining that "[t]he Fourth Amendment proceeds
as much by limitations upon the scope of governmental action as by imposing
preconditions upon its initiation. 70 In permitting frisks based on "articulable
suspicion,' 71 Terry tailored the level of suspicion required to the intrusiveness
of the search. This tailoring, in turn, opened the way to a sliding scale in
which, the less intrusive the search, the less demanding the procedural
requirements for the search to be "reasonable."
Of course, the balancing standard developed in Katz, Camara, and Terry
continued to provide the home and office with an exceptionally high level of
protection.72 The similarity of result-and of rhetoric 73-should not obscure
the change in doctrine; the same high level of protection provided by the
balancing approach now follows from the fact that any entry into the home or
office is virtually certain to impose significant collateral damage. As Professor
Seidman notes, when the police conduct such a search, they will almost
inevitably interfere with legitimate activity, disrupt personal belongings, and
discover personal details that they have no right to learn.74 Even in a case in
which police did no more than place a tracking device inside an object to be
brought into a home, which permitted the officers nothing more than the
"[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of [the location of] property.., withdrawn from
public view,"75 the Court has found that the probability of collateral
disclosure is significant enough to demand judicial oversight.76 Private homes
are areas that "deserve the most scrupulous protection from government
invasion" in order to "protect those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. 77
Nevertheless, although the Court occasionally proclaims that "searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,
' 78
the presumption that a warrant is required can be rebutted if the Court finds
that the social need for a search outweighs the damages it imposes. Camara
70. Id. at 28-29.
71. Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971); see also Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Where, however, the warrantless arrest is in
the suspect's home, that same balancing requires that, absent exigent circumstances, the result be [a Fourth
Amendment violation]. The suspect's interest in the sanctity of his home then outweighs the governmental
interests." (emphasis added)).
73. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
74. See Seidman. supra note 61, at 1088-89.
75. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
76. Id. That the property in question, a can of ether, was not itself contraband likely played a decisive
role in the Court's analysis, since one has no privacy interest in contraband. See United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 83-93.
77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984).
78. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587
(1980); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) ("'[A] search or seizure carried out on a
suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence
of "exigent circumstances."" (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971))).
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was one such case. Griffin v. Wisconsin, upholding the warrantless search
of a probationer's home, was another. In Griffin, the Court explained that,
although searches of the home are usually "undertaken only pursuant to a
warrant... we have permitted exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable.'
8
And here the remarkable feature of the Net-wide search for digital
contraband becomes apparent: Despite the number of home and office systems
searched and despite the total absence of particularized suspicion, the search
would result in virtually no collateral damage as currently understood by the
Court. There would be no frightening confrontation with authority, no
possibility for abuse of discretion, and no disclosure of irrelevant information,
private or otherwise, to the police. The Court has noted that "the problem
[inherent in the general warrant] is not that of intrusion, per se, but of a
general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings,"8' and the
remarkable feature of the Net-wide search is that it allows an intrusion without
the slightest meaningful rummaging.
82
As a consequence, under current jurisprudence, such a search would
unquestionably be "reasonable." While most balancing tests require the use of
judgment and discretion to weigh the different elements, no balancing is
required where all the weight is on one side. Even a casual government
interest, much less than compelling, might justify this search.
Two decisions in particular, United States v. Place83 and United States
v. Jacobsen,84 laid the foundations for this conclusion; together, these cases
held that a minimally intrusive practice that reveals "only the presence or
absence of ... contraband" 85 is not recognized as a "search" by the
Constitution and hence does not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The
first of these cases, United States v. Place, addressed the question of a dog's
sniffing of a suspect's luggage for narcotics. The Court noted that since such
a sniff "does not require opening the luggage [and] does not expose
noncontraband items that would otherwise remain hidden from public
79. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
80. Id. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment)). To see the same balance applied to the office, compare Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978) (holding warrantless inspections of all businesses impermissible) with New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691 (1987) (finding that state interest in preventing car theft justifies warrantless inspection of
junkyard office).
81. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,467 (1971), quoted in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 480 (1976).
82. Of course, in the most technical of sense, the computer search could be described as both "general"
and "exploratory" inasmuch as it scans through all files in search of the forbidden one. However, since this
scan reveals nothing and thus involves none of the collateral damage generally associated with
"rummaging," the Court would almost certainly conclude that it involved no meaningful rummaging.
83. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
84. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
85. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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view... the information [so] obtained is limited" to the revelation of
contraband. 86 The Court continued:
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in
which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure. Therefore... exposure of
respondent's luggage.., to a trained canine did not constitute a
[Fourth Amendment] "search".. . .s
While some would have read this conclusion as resulting from the dog's
use of odors outside the defendant's property,88 the Court made clear the
following year that the decisive fact was "that the governmental conduct [in
Place] could reveal nothing about noncontraband items." 9 In Jacobsen,
federal agents tested a small amount of a white powder that Federal Express
employees had accidentally discovered in a package. The test destroyed the
small sample, but it identified the substance as cocaine. In response to
arguments that the test constituted a search, the Court explained that
"governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is [contraband],
and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
interest."' As a consequence, the police are free to seek such contraband so
long as their search "could, at most, have only a de minimis impact on any
protected property interest." 9'
While this conclusion may seem a bright-line rule and a radical departure
from the balancing test, it is instead the logical result of that test. A minimally
intrusive governmental practice that can reveal only contraband by definition
cannot have a recognized collateral effect and so cannot possibly be found
unreasonable. While some judges and scholars have objected that being forced
to submit to inspection by a large, panting dog inflicts cognizable harm,92 this
criticism is directed at the Court's interpretation of the intrusiveness factor
rather than at the test's formulation. If one accepts the Court's implicit
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 708 F2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding use of trained dog
to detect odors of illegal drugs emanating from luggage and other closed containers not Fourth Amendment
violation because odors accessible to public).
89. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n.24.
90. Id. at 123.
91. Id. at 125.
92. See, e.g., United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1985) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring); Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 563 (Pa. 1993) (Cappy, J., concurring) ("[Clitizens
(should be assured] that absent probable cause to believe criminal activity is afoot, they are safe from the
probing noses of canine carnivores... ); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(e), at 315
(2d ed. 1987).
1996] 1107
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 105: 1093
assumption that being sniffed by a dog involves neither confrontation nor
collateral damage, such a search is per se reasonable.93
Unlike the confrontation between dog and target, there is no possible claim
of collateral damage in the Net-wide search. As such, the consequence of the
Court's reasoning in Jacobsen is clear. Since the Net-wide search has only a
de minimis impact on the property interests of any individual94 and reveals
nothing "private" beyond the presence of digital contraband, the officers who
ran the Net-wide program would not be conducting a Fourth Amendment
search. The Court would even be relieved of the need to articulate a "special
need" exception from the individualized-suspicion requirement since only
"searches" require individualized suspicion.
IHi. AN UNBALANCED TEST: WHAT'S MISSING?
The conclusion that a Net-wide search would be per se unconstitutional
under the earlier standard and yet per se constitutional under the current
balancing test highlights a potential and often obscured risk of abandoning a
bright-line standard for a balancing approach. 95 While the most recognized
drawback of such a shift is the problem of judicial discretion, a less obvious
but no less important danger comes to light when the balancing test requires
no balancing. This is the possibility that significant interests included sub rosa
93. While Place and Jacobsen did not directly consider dog-sniffs of the home, several lower courts
have faced this issue. Although the Second Circuit in United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.
1985), found that Place did not apply to sniffs of the home, the Second Circuit seems alone in this position;
its Thomas opinion has been generally criticized by other courts; see, e.g., United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d
469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990) ("[W]e find [the Second
Circuit's] attempt to distinguish [Place] unpersuasive.").
94. An objection might be raised that, even if the search results in only a de minimis impact on a
single individual, the dragnet nature of the search would yield hundreds of thousands of de minimis costs
each time the search is run. Commentators have argued in the context of routinized drug tests and sobriety
checkpoints that the government's interest in a search's success should only be measured against the sum
of costs on society at large. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1196 (1988).
At the same time, the Court has regularly concluded that the benefits of such routinized drug tests and
sobriety checkpoints are properly weighed against the harm suffered by any single individual. See Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug tests); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (same).
95. "[The protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and
balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases .... Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
96. Over the last 25 years, commentators and dissenting Justices have repeatedly criticized the Court's
application of the Katz test. See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Betveen Government and Citizen?, 94 COLtJM. L. REv. 1751, 1752 n.3 (1994) (listing "impassioned"
article titles that reflect "academy's frustration ... [and] concern"). Any balancing test is vulnerable to both
honest differences of opinion among judges and to deliberate result-oriented manipulation; the latter
possibility in particular finds Justices and commentators alike claiming that the Court has placed its
collective thumb on the side of the government's interests. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 669 (1988).
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in the original standard will be lost when establishing the factors relevant for
balancing. 97 The Court may fail to identify particular elements because those
elements are ephemeral, difficult to articulate, or politically unpopular if made
explicit.98 In the context of the Net-wide search, this leads to the question:
What, if anything, might be missing in the balancing test as currently
articulated? What Fourth Amendment objections might be raised to a
computerized search that only uncovered illegalities and neither substantially
burdened its targets nor revealed irrelevant personal information?
The natural place to begin this inquiry is with the relation between
computers and the home and office, those areas privileged under the traditional
bright-line standard. For growing millions of Americans, our computers are the
instruments on which we compose and record our thoughts, organize our lives,
and maintain our communications with one another. The computer is our diary,
our date book, our checkbook, and our letter file. Perforce the very values that
one automatically associates with the home and office-the needs for privacy,
intimacy, and security-apply to the computers that are located there.
Nevertheless, to say that computers reached through cyberspace deserve
the same level of protection as homes and offices only begins to answer the
question, for certainly "'[c]rime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is,
of course, of grave concern to society . . . ."'99 The Fourth Amendment is not
an absolute bar to searches of the home, and as Arnold Loewy notes, it follows
from the government's right to search for and seize evidence of crime that "an
individual has no inherent right to secrete such evidence."'0' The fact that
evidence of a crime is located in the home does not confer upon its possessor
the right to withhold that evidence with impunity.
Professor Loewy's conclusion, however, that "if a device could be
invented that accurately detected [contraband] and did not disrupt the normal
[activities] of people, there could be no fourth amendment objection to its
use"'' only follows if one accepts his axiom that the Fourth Amendment
exists solely to insure that the innocent are as free as possible from intrusive
searches and seizures. In his view, the innocent should have no objection to
being searched by an "evidence-detecting divining rod"'12 so long as the
search carries no collateral burdens. While Professor Loewy's axiom seems to
be accepted by the current Court, 0 3 there are at least two independent policy
97. See Sundby supra, note 96, at 1753-54 ("What if the problem is not with judges improperly doing
their Fourth Amendment sums but with the factors themselves?").
98. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 350
(1974) ('[T]he Court cannot always state openly all of the considerations that affect its decisions.").
99. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948)).
100. Loewy, supra note 33, at 1244.
101. Id. at 1246.
102. Id. at 1244.
103. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984) (citing Loewy, supra note 33).
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interests that might favor the existence of a zone safe from governmental
intervention until the government has independently developed evidence of
wrongdoing. Inasmuch as these interests are fundamental to the roles of the
home and office, they were necessarily incorporated, if tacitly, in the original,
bright-line approach. And inasmuch as these interests are fundamental to the
well-being of society at large, they ought to be incorporated more fully into the
current balancing test.
A. The Need for Autonomy and Refuge
Clearly the home and office have always served a principal role as
psychological sanctuaries from the outside world. The Net-wide search, like
any "evidence-detecting diving rod," raises the question of how much one's
sense of sanctuary depends on one's control over the flow of information to
the outside world. While at first glance it might appear that the average citizen
would not be threatened by any given search for any specific illegality, the fact
that we cannot always predict in advance which socially disfavored actions will
be criminalized suggests that a Net-wide search lessens one's security in the
performance of such actions. Moreover, inasmuch as targets know that the
search could potentially be directed toward unpopular but noncriminal
activities, the search may impose a chilling effect on the exercise of such
activities.
The importance of being able to limit the flow of personal information has
long been recognized as a key component in the individual's ability to
establish a secure relationship with the outside world. In his 1967 book on
privacy, Alan Westin argued that privacy should be defined as selective control
of access to information about one's self or one's group.'1 4 This power over
information allows the individual some ability to govern how she appears to
others, and consequently allows her some control of her interaction with the
world. 105 Without that control, the individual's psychological security is
endangered, and her assurance of autonomy from the majority is
threatened.'0 6 Recognition of the need for such a space may illuminate the
Court's comment in Boyd that "[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
104. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
105. See J.M. Balkin, WhatIs a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1988 (1992)
("Our ability alternatively to provide or withhold aspects of our private selves preserves and constitutes our
autonomy.").
106. Loss of control over the flow of information about ourselves results in "psychological costs ...
including stress, tension, and anxiety." IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:
PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, TERRITORY, AND CROWDING 45 (1975).
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private property"'0 7 that violates the Fourth Amendment. To preserve the
security of such a realm, the Founders "conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone."'03
Naturally, no person has absolute control over all information about
herself, since every time she interacts with another person, she loses control
of the information about her that the other person has learned. 10 9
Furthermore, every time an individual takes an action in public or with public
consequences, she runs the risk that others will observe her action or will infer
that action from its consequences. Nevertheless, to the extent that an
individual's actions in public or with others"0 are voluntary, she knowingly
assumes the risk that third parties may learn and divulge such information
without her knowledge or consent. This is a natural part of human interaction,
and loss of control outside one's home and office is balanced by the existence
of a "private enclave where [s]he may lead a private life."' The home and
office play a critical role in establishing the boundary between the individual's
area of security and her area of public life.
It is true that the Net-wide search finds only "relevant" information, but
it is society at large and not the individual who defines what is illegal and thus
what is relevant. Outside of the limited number of enumerated substantive
restrictions, virtually any socially disfavored act can be criminalized at the
discretion of the majority; the individual would then retain no control over
whether or not information relevant to such an act would be revealed. In this
light, one critical problem with the Net-wide search or any other form of an
"evidence-detecting divining rod" is that it denies to the individual any space
in which she can be sure of controlling information about herself." 2 In short,
107. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885), quoted in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 474-75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The realm of privacy not breachable under
the bright-line rule also provides a limited solution to the problem of "cumulation." As currently articulated,
the Court's balancing test does not account for the fact that little intrusions on any particular individual can
accumulate to the point at which the subjective effect of each additional "minimal" intrusion is significantly
greater than if it had been the only governmental intrusion. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 439 (1988). A
bright-line test, by minimizing intrusions into the home, provides at least a sanctuary free of accumulating
"minimal" intrusions. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
bureaucracy of modem government is not only slow, lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It
touches everyone's life at numerous points .... Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity
of the sanctuary of the home is such-as marked and defined by the Fourth Amendment.").
109. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("The depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.");
see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,428 (1980) ("Perfect privacy is,
of course, impossible in any society.").
110. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) ("[O]ne contemplating illegal
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.").
Ill. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
112. In this respect, the regularized, suspicionless searches by means of metal detectors at airports (or
magnetic-strip detectors in libraries) are more acceptable searches, since one acknowledges that one has
entered places where others control the environment. Cf. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
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no refuge remains in which the individual would not have to worry about the
risk of exposure, for as control over the boundary between the area of security
and the area of public life disappears, so too does the area of security itself.
In the particular case of the Net-wide search, the need for a zone of
control is closely related to a "chilling effect" problem. Almost immediately
upon being presented with the hypothetical Net-wide search, many have
objected that, if the government can search for copies of child pornography,
it can also use the same technique to search for Communist party literature.
The obvious response, as the Court observed in Terry, is that the Fourth
Amendment "cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate
police investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct which is
closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional
protections."' 3 In other words, the fact that an officer without a warrant may
not constitutionally break down one's door does not prohibit an officer with
a warrant from so doing.
Nevertheless, if one accepts the definition of a "chilling effect" as a
government practice that constricts First Amendment freedoms through "the
present or future exercise or threatened exercise of coercive power,"" 4 a
search that eliminates an individual's control over the boundaries to her most
private realms would likely be perceived as a threatening exercise of coercive
power. Even if the government were scrupulous in searching only for illegal,
rather than merely disfavored, files, targets would nevertheless be aware that
at any time and without any warning the government could easily and
economically widen its scan to include disfavored files." 5 This possibility
is compounded by the knowledge that, unlike the general search of colonial
times, a widened Net-wide search might take place without the target's
knowledge. Inasmuch as an individual's computer is increasingly the tool on
which her most private thoughts are formulated, expressed, and recorded, those
with dissident thoughts would reasonably feel constricted in articulating them
given the awareness that they lack control over even their most personal means
of expression." 6
444,473 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (justifying airport and library searches). This is very different from
the home or office, where one's security depends on one's control.
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (6th ed. 1990).
115. Or that socially disfavored files could suddenly become illegal ones. See supra text accompanying
note 112.
116. Of course, preventing law enforcement from using such a tool at all will not necessarily prevent
rogue departments from creating one. Nevertheless, given the expense of developing, testing, and
maintaining such a tool, it seems unlikely that law enforcement would invest in it solely for its illegitimate
uses. On the other hand, once such a tool exists, law enforcement need not necessarily misuse the tool for
it to intimidate; the mere possibility of misuse may be enough to deter dissident thought. But cf. United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (noting that police technique "created a potential for an invasion
of privacy, but we have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.... It is the exploitation of technological advances that
implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence."). Of course, for this purpose, papers may be
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By contrast, a standard that insists that searches of the home and office be
based on individualized suspicion would require the government to assemble
first a reasonable belief based on information already outside the control of the
individual. In other words, not until the individual has acted with the
understanding that there could be telltale traces outside of her zone of control,
thereby knowingly risking public attention, does she become vulnerable to
government intrusion.' 7 This bright-line rule, by erecting a substantial
barrier at the border to the home, guarantees to each individual the possibility
of some control over the flow of personal information because it guarantees
her control of a realm in which she need not worry excessively about the
presence of others." 8
B. A Government of Limited Powers
A second objection to the Net-wide search might be found in the principle
that government should exercise only limited amounts of power. To say that
an individual has no right to secrete evidence is not to say that it is desirable
or appropriate for the government to have perfect enforcement powers. Justice
Jackson, concurring in part in Watts v. Indiana, observed that the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights were intended to "represent the maximum restrictions
upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible
with the maintenance of organized society itself."" 9 This observation
suggests that the Fourth Amendment might do more than merely protect the
innocent against unwarranted invasion; the Fourth Amendment could be seen
as a significant procedural check upon the total power of government.
It is, of course, obvious that the Constitution and Bill of Rights impose
specific substantive limits on the power of government-one need look no
further than the injunction that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."'20 Equally importantly, however, the Constitution
different, since almost by definition they implicate First Amendment values that are to be given broad
protection. But cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 n.16 (1964) (noting that stolen books or ledgers
of gambling operation are treated no differently than other evidence).
117. See Sundby, supra note 96, at 1768 ("When factual probable cause is the core regulating device
of govemment behavior, the Amendment is basically self-regulating because control over the government's
ability to intrude rests primarily with the individual. So long as a person does not engage in behavior
arising to probable cause.., individual privacy cannot be invaded."); see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Searches based on individualized
suspicion also afford potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact, be searched
because a person can avoid such a search by not acting in an objectively suspicious way.").
118. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Just as the right
to privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific behavior,
so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home is more than merely a means of protecting specific
activities that often take place there.").
119. 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Clearly, complete
obedience to the laws is not required for organized society to function, or society would long since have
disappeared.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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provides procedural restrictions on the use of power, such as the bicameralism
requirement and the requirement that bills receive either a presidential
signature or the approval of two-thirds of the members of both houses of
Congress.12 1 To allow the government to enact a law without satisfying such
procedural safeguards would allow the government to act with unreasonable
expediency; the safeguards thus serve to inhibit the growth of power.122
In a like manner, the Fourth Amendment can be seen as a deliberate
constraint on the power of government. Certainly, as the Court has recognized,
"there is nothing new in the realization that -the Constitution sometimes
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all";123
what may be new is the realization that the "price" of a minimum of
criminality is in fact one of the interests tacitly advanced by the Fourth
Amendment. It is worth remembering in this context that the colonists who
fought the writs of assistance were arguably at least as angered about
successful customs searches as they were about unsuccessful customs
searches. 24 A government that could reach out and discover wrongdoing
whose every trace was hidden in the privacy of the home was a government
that had arrogated and concentrated too much power in itself and left its
citizens too little freedom."5
The protection of property embodied in the Boyd decision can be seen as
a procedural safeguard that achieved the substantive goal of preserving
liberty.126 More than just demarcating a realm of personal privacy, property
provides private parties a source of power independent from-and potentially
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,946-51 (1983) (describing checks
and balances).
122. "IThe guaranties of due process, though... considered as procedural safeguards 'against
executive usurpation and tyranny,' have in this country 'become bulwarks also against arbitrary
legislation."' Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v.
California, I10 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
123. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
124. See Maclin, supra note 96, at 705-13 (tracing history of opposition to customs searches and
challenging concept that colonists engaged in smuggling were merely "'incidental beneficiaries of a rule
not designed for their benefit.' (quoting Loewy, supra note 33, at 1248 n.86)).
125. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 ANI. CRIM. L. REV.
257, 287 (1984) (noting that opposition leading to Bill of Rights came from those who "did not trust their
new rulers to exercise unchecked power either benignly or reasonably").
126. In a quite recent article, William Stuntz makes the argument that the Fourth Amendment's
principal focus "seems to have been to make it harder to prosecute objectionable crimes--heresy, sedition,
or unpopular trade offenses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regulatory offenses in the late
nineteenth century." William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
394 (1995). In this view, the decision in Boyd to prohibit the subpoena of a builder's records played a role
in impeding the regulatory state during the Lochner-era while having "no effect on the mass of ordinary
crimes." Id. at 400.
While Professor Stuntz may be correct, Boyd was hardly a case whose facts revolved around
expanding government regulation. It was rather a case about fraud and customs duties, and however
opposed the Lochner-era Court may have been to excessive substantive regulation, contractual fraud and
customs evasions were hardly the sorts of crimes that the Court was likely to find substantively
problematic.
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in opposition to-the state.'27 If the Framers' principal concern had been
merely specific substantive governmental offenses, they could have drafted an
amendment that prohibited only those offenses. 2 8 Instead, the Framers chose
to write an amendment with a reach considerably more broad. Of course, it
was a Constitution they were creating, and the knowledge that the Constitution
would face developments both novel and unforeseeable no doubt prompted
them to select a flexible and comprehensive instrument for limiting government
abuses. By choosing an instrument like property that is independent from the
government, they ensured a space in which virtually all governmental action
might be limited.
Even under a democratic system in which discrete and insular minorities
are judicially protected, criminalized actions may nevertheless serve several
important functions. For instance, limited violation of a given law may be seen
as a form of social insurance, protecting society against the possibility that the
government's policy is mistaken. Governmental action might be capricious and
ill-considered without violating any substantive right, for as James Wilson
explained to the Constitutional Convention, "Laws may be unjust, may be
unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect.' ' 29
To the extent that people defy such a law in spite of the potential penalties,
their actions may preserve opportunities that the majority has unthinkingly
foreclosed. Furthermore, continual disobedience by a minority may provide
society an impetus to reevaluate the law.
Crime in this sense may serve a purpose in the subtle processes of
negotiation that takes place between a government and a minority of its
citizens, or among citizens themselves where government would prove
ineffective. Where minorities have limited influence on decisionmakers, they
can often affect policymaking through widespread disobedience of particularly
burdensome laws. 30 For example, industrial "slowdowns" may spur labor
reform where strikes have been criminalized, draft dodging may undermine
support for a controversial war, and squatting may foster land reform when
other channels have proven ineffective. On a smaller scale, criminal acts may
serve as localized sanctions for damages that the law cannot efficiently police.
The farmer in rural Shasta County who castrates a trespassing bull is acting in
a criminal manner, but he is also upholding a social norm that encourages
127. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1352 (1993).
128. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980) ("Indeed, as originally proposed ... the
draft contained only one clause which directly imposed limitations on the issuance of warrants .....
129. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 73 (Max Farrand ed., 2d ed. 1911).
130. See generally JAMES SCO', WEAPONS OFTHE WEAK 35 (1985) (describing wide-scale resistance
that becomes "a social movement with no formal organization, no formal leaders, no manifestoes, no dues,
no name, and no banner.").
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ranchers to control their livestock in order to prevent unnecessary crop
damage.13'
This possibility for reevaluation is particularly significant when social
change is at issue. Inasmuch as society criminalizes that which it fears the
most, criminal laws occasionally represent a collective prejudice and an
irrational desire for the status quo. 132 If we limit all substantive protection
of disfavored action to only those actions currently recognized as substantively
protected by the Constitution, we limit the possibility of social development.
Today we recognize that segregation and McCarthyism were not merely unjust
and unwise but actually unconstitutional; 133 had the government been capable
of complete enforcement in 1950 of the then-constitutional majority will, 34
quite possibly both would continue today. Instead, "criminal" actions led the
way toward social change. As Durkheim once wrote, "[c]rime implies not only
that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it
directly prepares these changes .... How many times, indeed, it is only
anticipation of future morality-a step toward what will be!'
' 31
While clearly much of this change is accomplished through open civil
disobedience on explicit moral grounds, much more is accomplished through
concealed resistance on often selfish grounds. The actions of the farmer, the
draft dodger, the squatter, and the "slow" employee may be justified by an
ideology, but the majority of these actions are driven as well by self-interest,
and such actions would not be performed if they came at an immediate cost
to the actor rather than an immediate gain.' 36 Even the civil rights movement
in the South depended significantly on the covert support of individuals who
stood to benefit from the movement but who could not afford the price of
disclosure. 37 Widespread disobedience to the state is difficult enough when
there is a risk of serious punishment; it is virtually impossible when the
punishment is certain.
In the modem world, the problem of majority dominance is joined by the
problem of the increasing size of the regulatory state. Each year, various
131. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 217 (1991).
132. One such example would be anti-miscegenation laws. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Another would be anti-homosexuality statutes. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346 (1992)
("Statutes which criminalize homosexual behavior express an irrational fear .....
133. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529 (1963) (asserting "manifest
unconstitutionality" of segregation); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("The First
Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or
punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds
certain beliefs.").
134. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (finding no infirmity in law prohibiting
municipal employment for members of Communist party).
135. ]MILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 71 (George E.G. Catlin ed., Sarah A.
Solovay & John H. Mueller trans., 1938) (1895).
136. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 131, at 217 ("An informal enforcer ... wants to be able to act
surreptitiously.").
137. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 520-22 (1960) (describing danger attendant
upon revelation of NAACP membership list).
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branches of government enact large quantities of regulations, the vast majority
of which the average individual neither considers before they are enacted nor
knows about once they are in force. The sum total of such law is staggering:
One commentator estimates that there are over 300,000 regulations at the
federal level alone that are criminally enforceable. 38 Even if every law were
clear on its face, and even if there were no objections to the substantive nature
of any of the laws, the sheer multitude of laws and regulations would make it
difficult for an individual to be aware of, much less in compliance with, every
one. 1
39
As a consequence, at any given time a very large number of Americans are
in violation of some law, and such violations expose them to the punitive
power of the state. 40 Were the government suddenly to become aware of
these transgressions, the individual's reputation, property, and even personal
liberty would be subject to the discretion of the state.' 4' That discretion could
be turned against the individual and used to discourage disfavored conduct
totally unrelated to the original offense. Only the fact that the vast majority of
these transgressions will never be discovered allows an individual to feel that
she might live without a constant concern for her legal status. 42 Only this
limitation on the reach of government permits her to feel secure in her
autonomy.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the range of a given law is
often unclear. Examples abound of daily affairs in which it is difficult to know
when one is in violation of the law: Is a given use of copyrighted material fair
use? Does a given meal constitute a tax-deductible expense?' 43 Does a
suggestive picture of a child constitute child pornography?'" Does
138. See Thomas Leary, The Commission's New Option that Favors Judicial Discretion in Sentencing,
3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142, 144 n.10 (1990) (citing comments of Stanley S. Arkin at October 1990
conference at George Mason University).
139. Cf. James V. DeLong, The Criminalization of Just About Everything, AM. ENTERPRISE, MarJApr.
1994, at 26, 29 ("Governmental speakers at legal seminars concede that there are so many environmental
requirements and they are so complex that no one can be in compliance.").
140. See Stephen J. Adler & Wade Lambert, Common Criminals: Just About Everyone Violates Some
Laws, Even Model Citizens, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1993, at Al.
141. See id. ("The two authors ... admit, between them, to having committed 16 of the 25 offenses
listed on the chart on page A4, carrying maximum jail time of 15 years and fines of as much as $30,000.
Most of the dozens of people interviewed ... have violated eight or more.").
142. Cf. DeLong, supra note 139, at 30 ("[F]ew people in any position of responsibility are free of
an ominous sense of being subject to [legal] risks they cannot assess or prevent, no matter how honestly
they try.").
143. Approximately six million Americans, including many in the same households that are connecting
to the Intemet, now keep their personal accounting on the program Quicken. John McCormick, Our Man
Versus the Quicken Cult, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1995, at 49, 49. Under the same logic that applies to the
Net-wide search, an automated computer program that checked one's Quicken records against one's tax
return would be constitutional so long as the program revealed nothing to government agents beyond
noncompliance.
144. See, e.g., Paula Span, Sexy Calvin Klein Ads Spark FBI Inquiry: Investigation To Determine if
Child Exploitation Laws Were Violated, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1995, at Al.
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employing a teen part-time require Social Security payments? 45 In America
today, how many people could feel certain that they have violated no
criminally sanctionable law in the past year?
The protection of a secure zone around the home and office serves to
make some disobedience possible by allowing a space in which the
government's enforcement power is handicapped. In light of this, it will
perhaps be objected that this zone begins to sound like the general right of
privacy considered and rejected by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick146
While it is certainly true that such an expansive privacy right would achieve
the goals posited here, such a strong conclusion is far from necessary.
Legislatures might still outlaw activities that take place in the home and office,
and law enforcement might still prosecute such offenses. Individuals who act
in opposition to the law must do so knowing that society disapproves of their
actions and that they run the risk of punishment. Accomplices-or the effects
outside the protected areas of actions within-may betray the crime to law
enforcement. Individuals discovered through such revelations would be
appropriately subject to criminal punishment.
Nevertheless, in the interests of preserving the possibility of a low level
of criminal activity and of allowing individuals some freedom from the
punitive power of the state, the Fourth Amendment might be seen as militating
against any search technique that left society little flexibility. To some it may
seem paradoxical for a court to consider the need for disobedience. Of course,
to some it has always seemed a contradiction that the Constitution should
protect the right of individuals to support manifestly nondemocratic ideals. 47
In both cases, the Constitution permits opposition to the majority on the
understanding that a small dose of fundamental opposition keeps a democracy
balanced and functioning.
CONCLUSION: A NEW BALANCE
Let us assume that the Court, faced with the case of the Net-wide search,
recognized that the old standard had provided protections for important
interests, including the individual need for a zone of autonomy and the
collective need for a potential for disobedience, that were not incorporated into
the present test. 48 While one possibility would be a return to the pre-Katz,
145. Payroll accounting packages might also be searched. See supra note 143 (discussion of Quicken).
146. 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("[I]llegal conduct is not always immunized whenever it occurs in the
home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal drugs, do not escape the law where they
are committed at home.").
147. Compare HADLEY ARKES, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CrrY 81 (1981) (finding contradiction in
protection of ideas that deny democratic truths) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam) (protecting mere advocacy of anti-constitutional goals).
148. Professor Sundby argues that the Fourth Amendment might be seen as mitigating against actions
that undercut the mutual trust between the state and the citizen. In his view, "a crucial part of American
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bright-line standard, such an approach would generate many more problems
than it would solve. The Warren Court abandoned the bright-line approach in
the face of the growing complexity of modem life, and that approach would
be still less workable today.
In my view, the appropriate solution would be to retain the balancing
approach and modify the test to include these interests. Once included in the
test, these factors would create a presumption against the Net-wide search that
could only be overcome by a strong showing that the digital contraband in
question represented an immediate danger to life and limb. Justice Jackson
once wrote, "if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment ... it seems to me they should depend somewhat on the gravity
of the offense."' 4 9 Although the Court has never incorporated Justice
Jackson's position into the definition of probable cause as such, the Court has
appropriately achieved the same result by including the weight of the
government's needs as a factor in determining the level of individualized
suspicion required for a given search.
As a consequence, while the Fourth Amendment ought to prevent routine
uses of the Net-wide search for nonviolent criminals such as software pirates
or possessors of child pornography, it would not have prevented a Net-wide
search on the day the Unabomber delivered his manifesto to the New York
Times and the Washington Post.5' On the extraordinary occasion when a
search might yield reliable evidence tying its possessor directly to violent
crime, the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment clearly yield. Not only
is there a negligible social interest in reevaluating the value of violent
disobedience, but even the threat to one's autonomy is less serious in the case
of physical violence to others. Such crimes are comparatively rare, and we
need have little fear that the majority will suddenly criminalize something
previously personal. Although the use of the Net-wide search for violent crime
restricts the area of the individual's autonomy slightly, a firm limitation to
immediate threats of violence would present little threat of future government
expansion.
The prospect of a Net-wide search in cyberspace presents us with a vision
of a search that might cheaply, easily, and effectively scan through areas as
sensitive and central to our personal security as our diaries, our checkbooks,
democracy's staying power is the role of reciprocal government-citizen trust in fostering the confidence
among all individuals that they have the opportunities and capabilities to participate meaningfully in
society." Sundby, supra note 96, at 1779. In a sense, the need for disobedience and the need for trust are
flip sides of the same coin: in both cases, the state must consider the individual as, to some degree, a
sovereign capable of individual choice rather than an obedient subordinate.
149. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting in part).
150. Such a search would have been possible, since at the moment the manifesto was delivered,
presumably only the New York Times, the Washington Post, Penthouse, and the Unabomber himself
possessed it. See John Elson, Murderer's Manifesto: Threatening More Attacks, Unabomber Issues a Screed
Against Technology, TIME, July 10, 1995, at 32, 32.
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our calendars, and our correspondence. The prospect of such a surgical
search' thus requires us to ask, in essence, whether there is not a limit to
even the legitimate power that might be exercised by the state, and if so, what
the contours of that limit might look like. In this respect, it is important to
remember that while "[t]he touchstone of [the Court's] analysis under the
Fourth Amendment is always.., reasonableness,"'152 the Founders' ultimate
desire was not that the government be reasonable but rather that the people be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.
The vision implicit in the Fourth Amendment reaches beyond the dictates
of simply seeking more efficient enforcement techniques. The Court once
noted that neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment is "an adjunct to the
ascertainment of truth .... [Rather, those privileges] stand[] as a protection of
quite different constitutional values-values reflecting the concern of our
society for the right of each individual to be left alone."' 53 The values of
one's home and office as a psychological refuge and as a source of power
independent of the government represent a pair of interests protected by the
property-model of the Fourth Amendment. The continuing importance of these
interests suggests that there is indeed an outer bound beyond which a
.constitutional government cannot reasonably expand, and that as a consequence
the list of factors to be balanced is seriously incomplete. Until now, these
omissions have been largely obscured by other, serendipitous limitations on
governmental conduct, but as technology makes possible more economical and
more targeted searches, the Court will need to expand its current test if the
balancing approach is to continue to serve the fundamental purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.
151. While the Net-wide search is one such surgically targeted search, other technologies might
achieve the same effect. One reported case on thermal scanners suggests that the operator of a thermal
scanner can "determine the level of coffee in a cup, and tear ducts on a human face" from outside the
home. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994). While a human operator might
thus discover private facts, a computer could in theory be attached to the scanner and report only evidence
of criminal activity (like the thermal patters of a marijuana plant). The resulting device would function
much like an "evidence-detecting divining rod."
152. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam).
153. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 416 (1966).
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